An l ∞ linear approximation problem, also known as (discrete) Chebyshev approximation problem is the problem of minimization of the following function:
where f 1 , . . . , f m are m affine functions of n variables. This objective function is piece-wise linear and convex. An l 1 linear approximation problem, also known as finding the LAD (least-absolutedeviations) fit, is the problem of minimization of the following function:
where f 1 , . . . , f m are m affine functions of n variables. This objective function is piece-wise linear and convex. A matrix game is given by a (payoff) matrix A. To solve a matrix game is to find a row p (an optimal strategy for the row player), a column q (an optimal strategy for the column player), and a number v such that p = (p i ) ≥ 0, p i = 1, q = (q j ) ≥ 0, q i = 1, pA ≥ v ≥ Aq. The number v is known as the value of game. The pair (p, q) is known as an equilibrium for the matrix game.
As usual, x ≥ 0 means that every entry of the vector x is ≥ 0. We write y ≤ t for a vector y and a number t if every entry of y is ≤ t. We go even further in abusing notation, denoting by y − t the vector obtaining from y by subtracting t from every entry. Similarly we denote by M + c the matrix obtained from M by adding a number c to every entry.
A matrix game is called symmetric if the payoff matrix is skew-symmetric. Recall that the value of any symmetric game is 0, and the transposition gives a bijection between the optimal strategies of the players.
A linear constraint is any of the following constraints: f ≤ g, f ≥ g, f = g, where f, g are affine functions. A linear program is an optimization (maximization or minimization) of an affine function subject to a finite system of linear constraints.
Statement of results
It is well known, that solving a matrix game can be reduced to solving a pair of linear programs, dual to each other. It is also known that solving any linear program can be reduced to finding an optimal strategy with positive last component for a symmetric matrix game. In both reductions, the size of data (in terms of the number of given numbers or the number of given bits) may increase at most two times.
A subtle point here is: how can we compute an optimal strategy (for a symmetric game) with a positive last entry or prove that no such strategy exists? An answer is that for any vertex in the set of optimal strategy with positive last entry is a solution of a system of linear equations whose coefficients are the entries of the payoff matrix or 0,1, so a positive lower bound α can be given for this entry (at least in the case when all given numbers are rational). Namely, let β be an upper bound for the absolute values of the numerators and denominators of the entries of the payoff matrix of size N by N. Then α = β −2N N −N/2 will work. Notice that 0 < α < 1. The mixed strategies for the column player with the last entry ≥ α in the symmetric game are the mixed strategies for the column player for the modified game obtained by adding the (α/(1 − α))-multiple of the last column to the other columns of the payoff matrix. The optimal strategies for a modified matrix game give optimal strategies with positive last entry for the original symmetric game provided that the value of the modified game stays 0 (otherwise, there are no optimal strategies with positive last entry for the original symmetric game hence the original linear program has no optimal solutions).
Given any l ∞ approximation problem with the objective function (1), here is a wellknown reduction (Vaserstein, 2003) to a linear program with one additional variable t:
This is a linear program with n + 1 variables and 2m linear constraints. Since any linear program can be reduced to a matrix game (see above), we conclude that finding an Chebyshev fit can be reduced to solving a matrix game.
The converse reduction is a main goal of this paper: Theorem 1. Solving any matrix game can be reduced to finding a Chebyshev fit. More precisely, when the game is given by an m by n matrix, we construct a Chebyshev approximation problem with 2m + 2n + 3 affine functions of m + n + 1 variables as well as a bijection between the equilibria for the matrix game and the solutions for the approximation problem.
Given any l 1 approximation problem with the objective function (2), here is a wellknown reduction (Vaserstein, 2003) to a linear program with m additional variables t i :
This is a linear program with n + m variables and 2m linear constraints. Since any linear program can be reduced to a matrix game (see above), we conclude that finding the best l 1 -fit can be reduced to solving a matrix game.
The converse reduction is the second goal of this paper: Theorem 2. Solving any matrix game can be reduced to solving an l 1 linear approximation problem. More precisely, when the game is given by an m by n matrix, we construct an l 1 approximation problem with 4m + 4n + 6 affine functions of m + n + 1 variables as well as a bijection between the equilibria for the matrix game and the solutions for the approximation problem.
Proof of Theorem 1
Consider any matrix game with the payoff matrix A with m rows and n columns. It can can be reduced to the symmetric game with the payoff matrix
where J (rest. J ′ ) is the column of m (resp., n) ones and the number C is such that A + C > 0. The skew-symmetrix matrix M = −M T has size (m + n + 1) × (m + n + 1). (J. von Neumann suggested another reduction resulting in a skew-symmetric matrix of size (mn) × (mn) which is not so good from computational point of view.)
The bijection between the solutions (p, q, v) for the game with the matrix A and the optimal strategies for the row player in the symmetric game with the matrix M is given by
Note that the last entry of any optimal strategy for the symmetric game above is positive because A + C > 0. Now we start with any matrix game, with the payoff matrix M = −M T of size N by N. (In the situation above, N = m + n + 1.) Our problem is to find a column x = (x i ) (an optimal strategy) such that
This problem (3) (of finding an optimal strategy) is about finding a feasible solution for a system of linear constraints. It can be written as the following linear program with an additional variable t and the optimal value 0:
Adding the number c to every entry of the matrix M, we obtain a matrix M + c ≥ 0 (all entries ≥ 0). The linear program (4) is equivalent to
in the sense that these two programs have the same feasible solutions and the same optimal solutions. The optimal value for (4) is 0 while the optimal value for (5) is c. Now we can rewrite (5) as follows:
which is a Chebyshev approximation problem with additional linear constraints. We used that M + c ≥ 0, hence (M + c)x ≥ 0 for every feasible solution x in (4). The optimal value is still c. Now we rid off the constraints in (4) as follows:
Note that the optimization problems (6) and (7) have the same optimal value c and every optimal solution of (6) is optimal for (7). Conversely, for every x with a negative entry, the objective function in (7) is > c. Also, for every x with x i = 1, the objective function in (7) is > c. So every optimal solution for (5) is feasible and hence optimal for (6).
Thus, we have reduced solving any symmetric matrix game with N × N payoff matrix to a Chebyshev approximation problem (7) with 2N + 2 affine functions in N variables.
Proof of Theorem 2
As in the proof of Theorem 1, we first reduce our game to a symmetric N by N game where N = m + n + 1 and set c to be largest entry in the matrix M. The case c = 0 is trivial, so let c > 0.
We want to find a column x such that
Consider the l 1 approximation problem whose objective function is
with 4N + 2 affine functions of N variables.
Note that f (x) = N c + N for every optimal strategy x and that f (x) > N c + N for every x which is not an optimal strategy. So solving this approximation problem is equivalent to solving the matrix game.
Remark.
Our result implies that every l 1 linear approximation problem can be reduced to a l ∞ linear approximation problem and vice versa.. There is an obvious direct reduction of the l 1 approximation problem with the objective function (2) to max |f 1 ± f 2 ± · · · ± f m | → min which is a Chebyshev approximation problem with 2 m−1 affine functions in n variables. This reduction increases the size exponentially, while our reductions increases the size linearly.
There are methods for solving l 1 approximation problems alternative to the simplex method [Bloomfield-Steiger 1983] . Our reductions allows us to use these methods for solving arbitrary linear programs and matrix games.
Remark. A preprint with Theorem 1 appeared at arXiv [Vaserstein 2006 ].
